ONDON, July 19 —
John Browett, the chief executive of Tesco.com, the online arm of
Britain's largest supermarket chain, is no stranger to the
intricacies of home delivery. So when he visited the warehouse of an
Internet grocery company in the United States last year, he noticed
that it was using a fancy conveyor belt to ferry boxes around a
corner, when another gadget would have done the job for half the
price.
Company executives defended their choice, Mr. Browett recalled in
a recent interview, as worth the expense because it enabled them to
start up sooner.
"People were making some very strange decisions," he said. "They
were saying things like, `I'm going to get the revenue first and
work out the cost structure later.' "
Tesco was not in such a hurry; what was the rush? Instead of
trying to revolutionize the mundane chore of grocery shopping with a
high-tech approach relying on expensive centralized warehouses,
Tesco simply added a modest online delivery service to its
traditional supermarket operation.
And now that Webvan, the most prominent of the various
stand-alone Internet food shopping companies has failed after
pouring $1.2 billion into the attempt, Tesco's tortoiselike approach
to the business is clearly more likely to succeed.
Tesco neither designed a glitzy Web site nor spent millions on
the latest distribution facilities. It has invested just $56 million
in its online endeavor, a business that now has $422 million in
annual sales, making it the largest in the world. Last year, Tesco
earned a pretax profit of $1.6 billion on total sales of $30
billion.
Moreover, Tesco says it makes an undisclosed annual profit on its
online service, which analysts estimate to be in the range of $7
million. And the company is exporting its expertise to the United
States in a deal with GroceryWorks, an Internet venture now
half-owned by Safeway (news/quote).
Still, while Tesco's store-oriented approach appears to be
winning out, the debate over which method works best is not quite
over. Publix Super Markets (news/quote)
of Lakeland, Fla., by contrast, is building big fulfillment centers
for its online operations. Still others, like Ahold, a Dutch company
that recently bought the rest of Peapod, a grocery shopping start-up
serving Chicago and some cities in the Northeast, is experimenting
with a hybrid bricks-and-clicks method.
Jan Hol, an Ahold spokesman, said Peapod is making a profit in
the Chicago market, although he declined to provide details.
With such deep-pocketed supermarket chains taking the place of
idealistic but cash-short entrepreneurs, this will be a battle drawn
out over decades rather than years. Even the most optimistic
forecasts now predict that food deliveries by online ordering will
remain a relatively small share of the overall grocery business for
the foreseeable future. Jupiter Media Metrix (news/quote)
predicts that by 2006, online food shopping in the United States
will reach $11.3 billion, or 2 percent of all grocery sales, up from
$800 million, or 0.2 percent of total sales this year.
For the better part of the last decade, Tesco has been concerned
with improving operations at its stores rather than experimenting in
cyberspace. That penchant for efficiency paid off by helping Tesco
increase its share of the retail food market in Britain from 10
percent in 1991 to 16 percent today, putting it ahead of Sainsbury
as the country's leading supermarket chain.
Tesco took its first online order in 1996, inspired by futuristic
technologies that Terry Leahy, its chief executive, had seen
demonstrated at an Andersen Consulting Smart Store a year earlier.
But Tesco was still unsure whether to pursue the warehouse model or
to have its 690 British stores double as distribution centers.
Both strategies had risks. Building huge warehouses would cost
millions of pounds that Tesco was hesitant to spend on an unproven
service. But packing and picking groceries from stores could clog
the aisles and frustrate customers. So Tesco ran a series of
calculations that turned up surprising results.
To get enough volume to justify the cost of building a warehouse,
Tesco determined it would have to serve too wide a swath of the
population from one location. In London, for instance, a single
warehouse would have had to deliver to an area stretching from the
northwest to the center of town, a distance that would have taken
hours to cover even if London's traffic were not as notoriously
jammed as it is.
"The vans would have left on Friday," Mr. Browett said, "and not
returned until Saturday."
But by delivering from local stores, Tesco found, no route would
take more than 25 minutes.
Once it settled on its approach, Tesco set about creating a
system that would allow it to pick and pack groceries efficiently
from stores. Rather than walking up and down the aisles pulling a
product from the shelves individually, employees use carts equipped
with a computer that determines the most effective path, allowing
six orders to be filled simultaneously. The products are
automatically scanned into a virtual cash register, all of which has
helped to reduce picking time by one-third, Mr. Browett said.
Last, Tesco determined there was no way to make a profit unless
it charged a delivery fee per order of £5, or about $7. Many
competitors in the United States shied away from imposing such a
hefty upfront fee for fear of turning off potential customers.
Shoppers like Susan Goulding, a 34-year-old resident of
Middlesex, England, are willing to pay.
"It's much more convenient to order the stuff over the site and
have them deliver it rather than spending a few hours in the
supermarket," Mrs. Gould said, adding that since she gave birth to a
son 10 months ago she does her grocery shopping online every week.