Rational Administration, Finance And Control Accounting:

the Experience of Cameralism

The goals and tactics taught to students of Cameralism in the 17th and 18th centuries are here introduced and described. These future servants of despots were taught by professors who combined practical exercises with welfare theory. That theory was modified by the reception of Smith’s liberalism. Teaching methods evolved into the seminar. Statistics were collected and became the subject of probability calculations. Uncertainty was reduced by comparing dues and actuals. Controls and budgets developed centuries ago for bounded states, have only in recent decades been advocated and applied to firms operating in an unbounded, competitive environment. Private-sector managers as well as administrators elsewhere are shown to be trained today in many Cameralist techniques which were developed during the period of the Enlightenment.

Key-words - Enlightened Despotism; Cameralist Management.

Rational Administration, Finance And Control Accounting:

the Experience of Cameralism

"The genesis of modern management" in Britain is well known through the work of Sidney Poilard (1968) and others. But the interaction of commercial, management and accounting practices with the methods used by the state is less known particularly in their developments on the continent of Europe. In Germany and elsewhere, however, an increasing literature demonstrates that there have been important interactions between public and private sector practices and between commercial and Cameral teachings. Students of accounting history have enjoyed support greater than that given to investigators into the history of management in the public or private sectors. Management has been taught at "tertiary" level only for about a century, while the origins of public administration teaching seem even more recent and tenuous. Each reader will have expectations formed from experiences of accounting, commerce and their relations to the state today, as well as from some knowledge of the period and countri es which are studied here. Present preconceptions may be called in question as we show much earlier and distant developments by professors of Cameralism.

The Cameralists dominated the teaching of bureaucrats who wished to serve the benevolent despots of the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment. They controlled the vaulted Treasuries or Camera of these princes. They initiated the teaching of administration and finance at universities. In a so-called Mercantilist era, they fostered trade, industry and agriculture with lofty goals.

We therefore find that these authors and teachers expressed strategies and tactics for the fulfilment of Welfare ideals in tightly bounded states. We find the origins of budgeting and planning and other accounting techniques for reducing uncertainty. But these techniques must be appreciated in their embryo form as well as in their development to meet changing environments. Similarly one must note that the professed goals of the Enlightenment were derided by powerful forces, by laisser-faire economics, by French Revolutionary individualism and by Romantics who opposed rationalism and calculation.

Our critical research into the goals in those states and their fulfilment is narrower than in the studies edited by C. Tilly under the title "The Formation of National States in Western Europe" (1975). We refer however to the role of frontiers and the need to defend them, and to markets which tended to interact across frontiers and thus proved difficult to regulate. The problems of the many petty states with which we are concerned were resolved only in part by customs unions and by the formation of the larger nation-states, in particular Prussia.

Background reading is available in English with the studies by Hubatsch (1975), Dorward (1953; 1971), Tribe (1984) and others. But much earlier an invaluable source-book was provided on the Cameralists by Small (1909) succeeded by wider studies of "The Origins of Sociology" (1924). His work came at the end of the period of extended German influence on American sciences and on the newly founded American Business Schools. The first teachers at these Schools used both commercial teaching methods and administrative theory. Their theory had been developed in part at least by the Cameralists (Herbst, 1965; Redlich, 1957) in states which may appear to have been European "crucibles" of welfare practices.

Many books resulted from the productivity of those German academics after the first Cameralist Chairs were created in 1727. Because of the copiousness of the literature, we offer indicative rather than comprehensive referencing. Surveys of this literature in German may be found in the analyses of Schneider (19817); Wysocki (1965); Schmalenbach (1950); Walb (1926) or in articles in many encyclopedias (cf. Oettle, 1990). Almost all German sources clarify that teaching materials and methods developed with some continuity from the first Cameralist Chairs of 1727 through to the commercial colleges and Business Economics (Betriebswirtschaftslehre) of this century.

We draw no repeated comparisons between the welfare intentions of those enlightened despots and the professions of 20th century socialist republics in Europe or the development ambitions of young states emerging from the ruins of postwar empires. Where there are similarities of sentiment, readers will doubtless draw their own conclusions. More difficult for both the researcher and the reader is to explore and explain the continuities in such techniques as budgeting and standard rations which were used in warring states in the 17th century and are adopted now by competing firms. Discontinuities over time require explanation just as much perhaps as dissimilarities in accounting, controls and administrative techniques for dealing with uncertainty between different entities, for instance in the public and private sectors. Yet explanations are offered here less frequently than an introductory documentation of matters deserving further attention by critical accountants.

The sequence of the sections which follow may be explained. In the introduction, the 18th Century environment for university teaching of bureaucrats is described. The Cameralist professors were apologists for the benevolence, rationality and enlightened Polizei of their masters. The absolutist agenda was sharply reduced as a consequence of the teachings of Smith and Kant. Thereafter we go into detail on statistics, planning, state provisions, and mercantilist companies. State financing tactics are described with special reference to Viennese evidence. Controls and budgets were developed for Cameralist accounting: they have been re-invented for the firm in this century.

At least twelve democracies draw together in the European Community today. These countries are in many cases the successors to the earlier states which are the subjects of our study. A patchwork of up to 400 principalities became states as the Holy Roman Empire lost its effective suzerainty and as wider feudal links were relaxed. Newly independent rulers sought to establish themselves also by undertaking welfare functions which had been fulfilled by church institutions throughout Christendom prior to the Reformation.

The states differed in size. There were the Empire based in Vienna and newly expansionist Prussia with its capital in Berlin; but there were also little principalities such as Weimar where Goethe was Chancellor at court. Despite periods of peace, defence remained important: it was entrusted no longer to feudal levies but to professionals with new ranks and orderings to implement strategies and tactics. The need to finance wars prompted economic and fiscal reforms (Tilly, 1975, p.243). War seemed to be the "ultima ratio regis’ or ultimate reason (Hubatsch, 1975, p.113). The changes due to war also challenged a rationalization of civilian society.

Communications were important to the frontiers of large and small states alike: as well as beyond those frontiers, and in to the new capital cities where many court functions had settled geographically. Courts had been always on the move; but administrations preferred to have a settled base. There too, enlightened despots built their chief palaces, their observatories and botanic gardens.

Princes tended to rival each other and to imitate the French kings in particular. Consequently facts ascertained about the finances in one state may be true (with some lag or lead) of others. There would be speedy translations too from Latin or French into German, with doctrines of despotism and responsibility.

The hierarchies of hereditary status were being eroded everywhere. Despots feared and resented all the privileges enjoyed by others. Privileges, regional differences and the rights of traditional "Estates of the realm" or of the Guilds in the cities were attacked long before the French Revolution. An individual subject emerged, without inherent rank and with precarious rights of suffrage and of property. Rights which were not completely rescinded might be made subject to special and expensive royal recognition. Trade and industry were restricted often to groups incorporated by royal decree. During the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, what Schmitter & Lehmbruch (1979) and others have called "Corporatism" displaced the estates and communities of tribal or sacred origin. New links were created between the princes and the people.

The erosion of older institutions was accompanied by the emergence of a bureaucracy in the pay of the despots. These civil servants edged out hereditary and feudal officials. Offices had been widely sold or made "venial". The Pope and Renaissance kings had raised money through the sale of offices of potential profit to the holder. The change during the late Enlightenment was striking - fees and bribes were replaced by salaries and pensions for the rationalized "public hand". The new administrators or Cameralists sought to establish high morale and professional pretensions to compensate for reduced performance rewards.

It has already been mentioned that the new bureaucrats operated within tight frontiers. It is not surprising that they found themselves at variance with those accustomed to trade across frontiers. Sometimes these traders could be subjected to special controls, such as those that were applied to Jews; and international links increased when some state drove out those of a heterodox faith. This was specially true when the French Huguenots were scattered. Through their cosmopolitan links they were willing and often able to undertake financing or supply roles beyond the abilities of domiciled bureaucrats.

A word should be said on Enterprise, which first features in the literature of economics with Cantillon (1730/55). "Projectors" were welcomed much earlier. They were expected to improve public credit by outrageous schemes, to operate exchange and arbitrage, and to exploit resources at home or to colonize abroad. Their access to natural science and technique was welcomed in so far as it served in defence or to enrich the public purse (Treue, 1957). Princes needed entrepreneurs; but they themselves could be innovators in terms of physical or social change. If there is today some failure in training in entrepreneurial skills (Swoboda, 1984, p. 21), we may find contrast in the education given centuries ago to the servants of enlightenment and change.

In contemporary phraseology, it may seem that change and change-agency were taught against assumptions which altered during the 18th century. At its beginning administrators were taught much "classroom" law, economics and finance. They also did practical exercises in "workshops". Then when Adam Smith’s doctrines were first expounded, it was hoped that civil servants could become more effective. But gradually the importance of his doctrines for general political education were seen to affect the relations between rulers and the ruled fundamentally. From the 1840s economics was largely emancipated from other subjects (Waszek, 1987, p.11). A gap in social science teaching appeared, for it lacked both the earlier workshops and the laboratories of the natural sciences. This gap was filled by seminars in which professor and students advanced in the same direction. These seminars feature later in our study of the educational methods of Cameralism.

Practical administration was therefore taught in German universities - as well as the seeds of conservative or revolutionary beliefs. These beliefs had to be implemented, however, in administrative tactics which were comprehended under the title of "Polizei". Included under Polizei were "Mercantilist" policies which were applied to varied areas. Best known are the commercial polices of Colbert in 17th century France: but similar protectionism was applied across Europe after Napoleon’s Berlin Decrees.

Indeed Napoleon’s despotism and "police-state" mark a climax of Polizei; yet at the same time it prompted a new and very wide freedom of spirit which during the 19th century was most threatened by capitalist or industrial oppression. Those who enjoyed the benevolence the least, and those who feared the policies and secret police the most, developed their own socialist theory. (Karl Marx married the daughter of a Prussian Minister of Polizei and police.) The socialism and Marxism which crossed frontiers with speed a century ago had many sources, but none were more important than the lecture rooms of German professors who were under the pay of princes. These doctrines sometimes permitted action where conditions were least improved.

A final introductory word may refer to the Cameralists’ tactics, in particular the finance and accounting controls, the provisions and the dues which were developed at that time. Many of these "tactics" were to reduce the uncertainties of the time. These tactics may be contrasted with those aimed at credit maintenance which had to be learnt and practised in large trading houses. Compared to the Cameralists, the trader’s education was practical and personal, whether in the family business or through business and family links abroad. Consequently among traders there was and has been a rejection or ignoring of administration or Cameralist class- and book-learning. And this has persisted in commerce and industry well into this century (Schneider, 1987, p.125). Such generalizations are supported by some evidence chiefly relating to the century after 1727.

During the 17th century, there was widespread educational experiment together with ideals to establish a new universal language and a supra national university ("universitas gentium") (Sadler, 1966. passim; Dorward, 1971 p. 218). But most universities served for the education of the clergy and were in a general decline. Some stimulus in the fields of administration and science was obtained on the Continent through contact with English writers such as Josiah Child and John Cary. Their influence was mediated through Cameralists such as Von Schroeder who was an active member of the Royal Society in London from 1633 to 1674, or J. J. Becher who fled to England in 1680.

With manifold promptings, the rulers of Prussia took important initiatives. Frederick Ill founded Halle university in 1694, and then an academy of arts in 1696 and his own Royal Society of Sciences in 1700. Other important educational developments, tending to open training to all, followed under Frederick William I who ruled from 1713 to 1740 (Dorward, 1971, pp.181/ 219). Especially notable for us were the first Chairs in administrative or Cameral Science established at the Prussian universities of Halle and Frankfort-am-Oder in 1727 (Dorward, 1971. p. 207ff.). The initiative was gradually imitated. In 1730, the King of Sweden endowed a chair in Rintein. Further Chairs were established in Leipzig (1742), Vienna (1752), Gottingen (1755), Prague (1763), Freiburg, Innsbruck and Klagenfurt (1768) and lngoldstadt (1780). Thus each prince ensured that administration was taught at one or more universities in his dominion (Maier, 1966, p. 214).

Gasser, writing in 1729, noted some grounds for the first foundations. Scholars, he claimed, had traditionally been aloof from practical concerns and had been poor at real-life economics. The King of Prussia was displeased at general managerial incompetence even in petty cash control; lawyers were felt to offer no solution, for were they not sucking the country dry? Monastic laziness he derided, but urged that some tricks in the clerical economy could be adopted by the laity, even though Aristotle had left no books on such matters (Small, 1909, p. 210)

Details are available on how the earliest courses were built up. The development of teachable material was entrusted to a specialized "Policey- or Cammer-collegium", according to Zincke (1755). The professors so feared a theory derived from Aristotle or from theologians that they concentrated on practice. In consequence, practical instruction in Cameralist functions was given. Professor Gasser set aside in the 172Os

There were problems ahead, however. An efficient bureaucracy dependent on the Crown could be achieved only through the displacement of the holders of feudal or heritable offices by salaried and pensionable officials. As so-called Directories were established in Prussia, with provincial Treasuries or Kammer, these were staffed by many of non-noble rank, even under Frederick William (Hubatsch, 1975, p.31). Over 1500 administrators and tax-collectors were introduced from France (Henderson, 1963, p.64). But the other administrators were not necessarily university trained. Frederick the Great expressed a preference especially for those with practical experience in administration, such as could be gained in newly acquired Silesia. The provincial Kammer thus came to be regarded as nurseries of ability (op.cit. p.161). Moreover, the value of trained intellects or initiatives in the service of the Prussian king was perhaps negatively correlated with the degree to which their duties were prescri bed. Old Fritz’s legal code had 16,000 laws to make it judge-proof (Dorward, 1955)

The subdivision and articulation of Cameral Sciences were progressive, and can be traced through branches. Maier (1966, p.233) presents the main elements, showing leading authors right into the 19th century.

with the names of those who earned repute in special Rational administration

The above framework (Figure 1.) is extended by Maier to include apparent overlaps. He reflects decades of endeavour but not of achievement in the area of Finance. (This French word of course originated in state finances, and has only subsequently been adopted in the private sector.) Maier also shows how Polizei studies of a modern national economy comprehended crafts, agriculture and trade. Polizei science, he traces, subdivided into Administrative law, especially developed by Gneist (1879), and Administrative theory with reference to L. von Stein (c.1865). The varied strengths of the Cameralist tradition are shown; and by the dates given, it is clear that it had survived the liberal, Smithian wave. Survival was however achieved at some cost. The Cameralists have been accused of failing to find a methodology adequate to their wide-ranging interests and to the specific functions later to be fulfilled by their students.

The problems in Cameralist teaching and methodology were not problems of productivity or ambition in coverage, since the encyclopedic traditions of the 18th century and of earlier pedagogues had been inherited. The Cameralist professors were a prolific group, and discoursed in class and in print prodigiously. In consequence in 1937, some 14,000 items were attributed to them in a bibliography (Schneider, 1981, p.115). Their students in turn could be tested in the widest areas of knowledge. But there was not yet opportunity to develop a research methodology.

One essay in self-criticism may be noted. Baumstark in an encyclopedia of Cameralism published in 1835 suggested that a study of specifics had prevented any conspectus being achieved of the whole of bourgeois economy and society. History, geography and anthropology (Volkerkunde) had been studied too little; and finance, he wrote, had not been brought onto a scientific level. He hoped that such failures would be alleviated through studies of Kant, Herder and Adam Smith rather than of the earlier protagonists of the welfare state. (Herder was the Romantic who could not persuade himself that anything in all the kingdom was a mere means; "all is at once means and end", he wrote in his Philosophy of History for the Education of Humanity.)

Soon after Baumstark wrote there was an important innovation not in the theory or understanding of their science but in how it could be researched and taught. This was achieved through seminars in supplement to lectures. The first to encourage very active student participation in his statistics seminars was K.F.W.Dieterici from 1844 (Waszek, 1987, p.291). Hansen succeeded him as Director of the Statistics Office in Berlin in 1860, and ensured the same collaboration from his students. Exercises were replaced by exploration: lectures by conversation and disputation.

By 1881, the seminar system had extended itself to Strasbourg. And Gustav Schmoller agreed to move to a chair at Berlin, on condition that he extend this method of teaching in a properly adapted building and with a library available. Astonishing outputs were achieved by collaboration both for the university and in research for the Verein fur Sozialpolitik. The work showed an anti-individualist and historicist commitment to social studies, as one might expect from those treading confidently in the Cameralist tradition.

The system described exercised an influence throughout Europe. Social responsibilities and competencies were clarified and taught to traders but much more to administrators. The Polizei was accepted for centuries and expressed by its apologists, the Cameralist professors. Some detail in documentation may be excused since the Continental advocates of the welfare state are not often quoted, at least in English. We refer to the agenda and applications also, in order to clarify some of their logical consequences in techniques of management, finance and accounting.

From the time of the Reformation, expectations of the Church were reduced (Kann, 1960, p.127ff.) and in compensation, princes were urged to pursue the welfare of their subjects. Present happiness gradually displaced eternal bliss as previously marketed. Many wrote of the need to believe in a future life with rewards and punishments (Small, 1909, pp.149, 511), while others emphasized the implanted desire for fame or glory (ibid. p.427). Clearly securities traditionally expected from membership of an enlarged family, a guild or other organization were redirected to princely "Polizei". Polizei was the term by which welfare was to be delivered by princes. Its use can be traced back to 1480 when Burgundian rulers who had earlier sworn to uphold "Recht & Friede" (Law and Peace) embarked on a search for "Regiment & Pollicei" (Maier, 1966. pp.118, 121, 170).

Under "Polizei" in an imperial ordinance of 1521, many matters of internal concern were comprehended - musicians, usury, monopolies, highways, security, and weights and measures (Dorward, 1971, p.15). More detail was added by Seckendorff in his book on the German Principality (1655). Princes were to establish peace, order and justice; provide adequate food supplies; encourage an increasing population and assure livelihoods; encourage moral behaviour and Christian education; require church attendance and forbid blasphemy, drunkenness, etc; preserve proper distinctions between the classes; establish building codes for safe and healthy buildings and issue fire ordinances; promote public health measures against disease, for clean water, for doctors and nurses, caring for the poor and orphans, and reducing the evils of brandy and tobacco; promote prosperity by encouraging industry, thrift and obedience; prevent usury by excluding or regulating Jews; protect against monopoly and high prices; est ablish uniform weights and measures; and control consumption at feast days and extravagance of clothing (cf. Dorward, 1971, p.16).

It is not clear how the comprehensive purposes in such agendas were to be ranked or achieved, even when Polizey was entrusted to a single official. Foucault (1973, p. 40) has noted that in Paris the police had

The Lieutenant of police had regulatory functions so wide that they were compared to that of gravity in the heavens! In addition, he was sole judge of crime and appropriate punishment, allying "this moral certitude with a profound knowledge of the needs of public order" (Chapman, 1970, pp.19, 29, 31).

Much later, Berg (1802, I, p.1) described the paternalist qualities of the public hand:

Polizei thus represented the beneficent and unsleeping hand of despot or emperor. The different functions were brought together in the architecture of capital cities, as in Jadot de Ville-issey’s drawings for Maria-Theresa’s complex of "Place, Eglise, Universite, prisons" (Ruckbrod, 1977, p.153). Close thought was given too by the apologists of Polizei as to how such a strategy could be implemented.

Frederick the Great wrote to Voltaire of his paternalist concern for half a million "sentient beings" in Prussia after a plague; or for those in East Friesia who were beset by both mice and taxation (Hubatach, 1975, pp.25, 84). He claimed that all owed their prosperity and security to the king. But alleviation of any trouble was most often imposed through a Prussian-style administration. We may then ask what preferred or comprehensive goals were sought either in this life or the next? An ethic of paternalism or altruism was present everywhere.

For the Cameralists, it was not being happy but making happy which was "the greatest and most exalted of all human activities to which a reasoning being can attain". We quote from Gerhard (1713; cf. Small, 1909, pp.418F, 374). He continued.:

What was pursued was neither the happiness of all sentient creatures nor the egalitarian and hedonist individualism of the West, which developed into Benthamite utilitarianism. Polizei accepted neither feudal ranking nor sheer egalitarian subjection, but rather assisted and envisaged an adaptation of each to his appropriate station. Polizei should enhance the prosperity proportioned to the lot of each, since all should not be brought into the middle class, wrote Zwicke in 1751 (Small, 1909, p.255).

The creation of happiness was the common goal for rulers and ruled. None with any other intention could rule over reasonable and free men, asserted Justi. While reasonable freedom was necessary to enable moral and temporal goods to be acquired by diligence, the ruler was entitled to support from his subjects in all the means and ways which he adopted for their welfare. Freedom was constrained only by the rules for his happiness to which every free and thoughtful being must subject himself (Small, 1909, pp.415, 33O, 413).

Clearly, such benevolence of any "father of his people" must encounter bounds in its effectiveness. Welfare as proffered and as received might differ. And the rationality and efficiency of the civil service in delivering happiness might be called in question. Such failures await our discussion, but first we must consider the categories by which the implementation of Polizei was judged.

Along with the welfare or happiness goal came a problem of an optimum or maximum population. For Seckendorff, for instance, in 1655 no conflict or trade-off was envisaged between adequate food and an increasing population. Hornick in 1684 commended both increases in population and employment together with a land survey, minerals exploitation and an erosion of the powers of the guilds (Small, 1909, p.132). Sonnenfels on the other hand saw the urban problem relatively early: he insisted that work should be available in Vienna, and accepted that its population should be controlled. But he enmeshed his argument with criticisms of celibacy (Kann, 1960, p.175). More generally, Leibnitz of Hanover asserted that the true strength of a kingdom lay in the numbers of its population. Frederick the Great in his "AntiMachiavel" preferred a larger population to a longer frontier (Hubatsch, p.111) He referred not to the need for recruits for his armies, but rather to his special responsibility to those whose han ds were their only asset (Hubatsch, 1975, p.70). Population pressures prompted policies of both internal and overseas colonization.

With such beliefs, a labour theory of value could be adapted without Malthusian fears. In 1804, F.B.Weber argued that national wealth depended on national revenue, and this on the labour or efforts of the citizen. "Labour is the immediate fund of all the incomes", he wrote, turning attention from mere numbers to the development and advantageous use of skills. The use of skills he held to be the goal of the internal administration and of the Cameral Science which he himself taught. Happiness and productivity were each to be administered with rationality and with minimum risk.

We now must examine the particular and very precise terms used or means advocated by the Cameralists in their hope to achieve an ordered society with safeguards against all risks (Tribe, 1984).

Prudence was a theory of rational keys to the use of means to happiness, according to Gerhard (1713). For Rohr five years later, cleverness was an adaptability of temper by which actions are directed with reason and foresight towards goals which in part are related to oekonomie or good husbandry. For Zwicke in 1751, means must be sufficient to achieve some end, such as a universal longing for welfare (Small, 1909, pp.179, 211).

Means and ends were related through the science of Economizing:

A law of Parsimony further required that means should correspond to the goal, and be the best and easiest. Nature and reason were both said to require that nothing be accomplished with greater force that might be adequately achieved with less (Justi, 1759; Small, 1909, p.420). Rationality and coherence are personally focused, however:

Both ends and means had a logic and coherence which required a major revolution before more disseminated powers and less bureaucratic rule could emerge. This revolution must now be described, before we review specific Cameralist techniques over time.

An alternative to the visible hand of each ruler of petty central European dominions was developed in Scotland, 400 miles from the Court of the United Kingdom. Government at a distance is held to have produced either deprivation or the benefits which may arise from such geographical separation. One notes that Westphalia and the Rhineland prospered as a consequence of the distance from their rulers in Berlin (Barkhausen, 1974; Hubatsch, 1975, p.69, with refs p.267).

Liberal concepts evolved in the Scots Enlightenment of the 18th century contemporaneously with Continental Cameralism. The Scots investigated natural laws applicable to human society, and expected progress from the workings of some innate or invisible hand rather than from intrusive bureaucracies. Fundamental ideas received from Continental authors such as Grotius and also Quesnay were alchemized by Adam Smith and re-exported with a varied reception. In his work on Moral Sentiments (1756/1976, p.233), Smith complained of the man of system who imagined that he could arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. Each of these pieces, he wrote, had a principle of motion of its own and different from that imposed by a legislature.

The impact of Smith’s "Wealth of Nations" (1776) in Central Europe has been documented by Tribe (1984), and more particularly by Waszek (1987) for Berlin and by Gottfried (1976) for Konigsberg. In Konigsberg, leaders of the Prussian civil service were instructed by Professor Christian Kraus on the merits of a free market-economy. Moreover such freedom was found to be compatible with the moral autonomy which was taught there by Immanuel Kant. Felicity is divided among every nation, (wrote Kant) and it could be concentrated in no place or century; each should be free to seek his own happiness (Werke, Vill, p.290).

Indeed Kant twisted the term "Enlightenment" to a new meaning, not for the one but for the many. It marked man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage.

Under such critique, benevolent despotism faltered as a philosophy, and Polizei acquired new and sinister connotations.

The Polizey-staat was seen first as simply a despotism, for instance by Weicker in 1813, and then as a police-state. The modern term was coined in 1838 (Maier, 1966, p.309); and as consequence the intelligence-gathering systems and secret police, intended to give internal security, gave Polizey a sinister meaning from the 19th century. But where autarchy was most extreme, the theory of a liberal economy was best developed in Austria

There was however some continuity maintained by the Cameralists in their social concerns and administrative theory and practice. Princes, when restored to larger nation-states after the defeat of Napoleon, accepted only some limitation of the state’s agenda. Policies derived from earlier days resulted later in the 19th century in Prussian education, social insurance and corporate supervisory boards each of which have been exemplars to others. Cameralist professors and their successors did not preside at what Marx foresaw as a withering-away of the state!

Once again, Gustav Schmoller must be referred to. In his lectures and seminars at Berlin, he taught that civil servants were not parasites but nation-builders and guardians of the common good against the miseries of UK-style industrial development. Indefatigable with the members of his Verein in practical and historical investigation, he presupposed possibilities of rationalism for his bureaucratic economy with reliance on educated administrators (Gottfried, 1976). He differed in much of his teaching from both Menger in Austria and Max Weber and Sombart. Interestingly Schmoller’s ethical tones found echo in business education.

Some of the agenda for the state was transferred to managers as taught in the commercial colleges founded from 1899. A mixture of administrative and market nationalisms was taught to the new management elite; and older cameralist traditions were continued (Schneider, 1981 p.130). Business economists were consequently not inexpert in managing an imperfectly cartelized and corporatist economy.

The education of bureaucrats has thus been traced especially in Germany; and attention had been given to the coherence of goals and of the general areas in which paternalism was expected and was so often exercised through civil servants also entrusted with recruitments and levies. The varying confidence and competences of the Cameralists now require further testing and exemplification with respect to particular applications of rationality over changing times.

As we survey practical methds and skills applied by the Cameralists, we must contrast their applicabilities in private and public sectors. These sectors neither were nor are of course totally separable. Nor should we distinguish too closely techniques used by states and estates, by firms or farms. An interchange was encouraged through the many interests and involvements of enlightened lords. When young, each may have been on the Grand Tour of Europe. When older, rulers experimented competitively with one another, and they relied on a more professional exchange of expertise. Developments in particular technologies may now be described.

Newly conquered lands and countries capable of development were surveyed, often by military engineers. This is seen in many countries. The Down Survey of Ireland was carried out by Cromwell’s troops, and provided data for Sir William Petty’s "Political Arithmetic". Vaubun, the great military engineer under Louis XIV, travelled around France whose frontiers had been extended; he accumulated data and called mathematics out of the skies for attachment to useful objects, according to Fontenelle (Butterfield, 1949, p.159).

Comparable surveys of Silesia or of territories acquired in Poland have attracted less attention. In 1776, a School of Cartography and Topography was established in the Berlin Schloss, at the instigation of the General Directory (Hubatsch, 1975, p.149). In most cases, a survey was accompanied by an inventorying of land. For known acreages, the Prussians were required to estimate yields based on good, average and bad harvests (Hubatsch, 1975, p.59). Such estimating was earlier and less sophisticated than the range-of-error conscious calculations of national wealth made by Lavoisier (1791). Neither advanced numeracy nor mathematical probabilism characterized statistics up till about 1800AD.

Instead we have Vaubun’s observations. Slightly later the term Statistics was used in the course of Colbert’s investigations in service of centralized absolutism. Boundaries, revenue yields and development potential were all to be the subject of reports to him: Boucher reported the goods, charges, debts and other "statistiques en communities" for Burgundy, 1666-1669 (Meyer, 1966, p.225).

The Prussians followed the French lead. Their General Directory required provincial commissariats and chambers (Kammer) to visit cities regularly, and carefully inform themselves of trade, commerce and manufacturing, of the citizens and their business and industry. They were to know their province as well as a captain should know his company. The royal demesnes were to be separately visited, and recommendations made on their lease or improvement (Arts.1, sec.18-20; Art.XXVII of Instruction and General Directory, 1722: Dorward, 1953, p.199ff.).

Whatever the ideal prescribed from the centre, problems arose in the recording and transmission of data. Frederick the Great preferred personal inspections of newly developed and other lands. And a discontinuance of the general ordinance survey for the War and Demesnes Kammer for Cleves was urged on the grounds of economy (Hubatsch, 1975, p.52). From the 1740s Cameralist professors such as Achenwall had classified all forms of knowledge concerning each state as ‘statistics". But we have seen that the term was in use earlier. Another term was also used by such as Seckendorff, the Austrian Cameral official: he proposed an information gathering service or "Intelligence Work". He sought voluntary collaboration, and also operated newspapers to disseminate news (Schneider, 1981, p.256). The statistics gathered were held to be necessary for rationalized development policies or to formulate and negotiate trade treaties. But intelligence was also gathered by a system of secret agencies, under the Emp erors Joseph II and Napoleon I (Chapman, 1970, p.20).

Human subjects were treated both paternally and also like other objects of reason. Estimates of population based on one or more statistical databases became more accurate in the 17th century. Population numbers and life expectancies were established. The former enabled estimates of growth, employment and military recruitment potential. Life expectancies of a reliable nature were sought to enable just terms to be offered for public borrowing by annuity or tontine, where the state’s liability ceased or was transferred on the death of the bond-holder.

The demographic calculations by Graunt and others connected with the Royal Society in London are documented (Hacking, 1984). Such calculations were also necessary in Central Europe. Sonnenfels’ in his 1765 Principles, demonstrated a great interest in demography, reviewing previous and international authors such as Bielefeld (1760), Zanony, Sussmilch (1742), Kerseboom and Melon (1736) (Small, 1909, p.488). The chief records used on the Continent were those for Breslau, 1687-1691. And these were exploited for life expectancies by Halley, the British astronomer. Actuarial enquiries had little commercial value before 1827 when life assurance was first made legal in Germany. Moreover life expectancies were not always welcomed by princes who were so often forced to put their subjects’ and troops’ lives at risk through war.

The probabilism of contemporary science may be traced to the search for enlightenment in government and gaming as well. Mathematical and statistical techniques developed from population and life-span data. Calculations were also on offer based on the probabilities of the gambling table. The rationality of Boards of officials was to be enhanced too, for instance when the "Ars Conjectandi" by Jacques Bernouilli (1705) suggested that matters of economics, morality and politics might be amenable to a solution using aleatory, probabilistic methods (Hacking, 1984, p.145). These were elaborated to meet gaming problems, to give satisfaction to mathematicians and to solve insurance and acturial problems in the governmental and private sectors alike. Pascal applied the theory to support a fire-insurance justification for religious belief (Schneider, 1981, p.236). One cannot therefore attribute probability theory chiefly to any sector or country: nor can its applicability be localized.

Differential risks were noted as values were added by artifice or agriculture. Certain types of producer and market risks were belittled in early mercantilist days. The competences of food-growers and of manufacturers and traders were contrasted. The contributions of land-workers, however efficiently controlled, were considered to be less reliable than the product of artificers. Serra in Italy in 1613 asserted that the peasant faced uncertainties of weather while "in industry there is always a certainty of gain, provided labour is expended".

Serra could write thus confidently in reliance on the closely controlled and less than competitive guild system of his time. A similar conclusion was reached by that arch-regulator, Colbert. He advised the Languedoc Estates, to manufacture cloths in preference to the uncertain products of the soil. Manufactures depend on the art, industry and application of men, he wrote, and are not subject to the inconstancy of the elements (Letter of 3/x/1681. quoted in King, 1949). Nevertheless uncertainties of demand and competition were to supervene, after several of the elements had been tamed by planned land developments

Discovery and colonization characterized 17th and 18th century Europe. But the expansionist forces led to colonial adventures, military aggression and to internal developments as well. Vanderlint and Melon, both writing in 1732. advocated peaceful commerce and planned developments (Milward, 1970, p.5). Von Justi held that any immediate gains from war would be followed by economic and moral loss. He recommended that aggrandisment should be replaced by better policies (1979; v. Small, 1909, p.257). Frederick the Great talked of a peaceful conquest of new provinces by drainage and settlement. He achieved a settlement of a quarter of a million people on such newly recovered land. Developments of this type yielded a "real solid plus" (in the words of Article XVII of the Prussian Instruction to the General Directory of 1748: Hubatsch, 1970, pp.101, 110).

Conquest and drainage took time, while estate planning horizons were commonly shorter to the next market and settlement day or through the agricultural year with its calendar of feasts and audits. Time-honoured routines would be altered only through purposive planning or despair. As for the Physiocrats in France, so for Frederick the Great,

We recorded earlier how planning and developments of estates were taught in practical classes to the first Cameral students. They were shown how improvements could be scheduled to fit in with seasonal farm work, by planning for each resource and valued output. Gasser expressed the need for soil analysis as well as for agricultural budgets (Small, 1909, p. 21 1).

Theory and practice were interlinked. Some instances may be taken at random:—The parish of Brackwede was to be enriched by better farming methods as suggested by J. E. Tiemann (Hubatsch, 1975, p.174). The Royal Society of Gottingen awarded Berghaus its prize for farm book-keeping in 1976 (Schmalenbach, 1950). Improvements in record keeping and analysis enabled agricultural trainings to be both practical, technical and scientific (Schneider, 1981, p.125).

Two leading scientific agriculturalists made their mark in the following years. A. D. Thaer (1752-1828) had a varied career before achieving a Chair in Cameralism at Berlin in 1810. He tested the effects of a rotation of crops. along with J. von Thuenen who is known for keeping exact estate accounts for over ten years before publishing his analysis of the results in "Der lsolierte Staat"(1842-1863). According to Schumpeter (1954, p.465), he was the first to apply calculus to economic data; but Buquoy had priority with his differential equations of 1816 (Schneider, 1981, p.70).

New frontiers might open for marginal analysis and planning potential. But within set estate bounds, factors of production became manipulated in ways which foreshadowed modem sensitivity analysis.

Some important intersects between state and estate management become evident. Agriculture and forestry seem to have affected private sector, marginal economics, but two other impacts may be observed. Food producers often agree on outputs or prices, but more commonly seek and accept state controls. More technically, we shall find that developments in state Cameralist accounting were presaged by estate experiments; and that planning is more applicable to the production of food, while food retailing flourishes through prompt adaptation.

A reduction of uncertainty through projections or plans came under liberal attack. In Kant’s Prolegomena of 1783, what might be called a colonization of the future was critized thus:

The planned provision of the necessities of life under the Polizei system had come under attack earlier.

One area where a system of Polizei and controlled markets proved increasingly unsatisfactory throughout Europe was bread. For centuries, assizes of bread had been held in communes or states. At these assizes, bread prices were related to those of corn. In many countries, such provisioning and the accounting for it have been described (Hernandez, 1984; Forrester, 1978).

In Berlin in the 18th century, the responsibility for securing staple foods at reasonable prices and under all conditions was taken seriously and not ineffectively by the cameralist administration (Hubatsch, 1975, p.60). But elsewhere especially from the 1750s. Polizei-regulated civic markets ceased to attract buyers and sellers simply because of the regulations intended to safeguard the lieges. Riots were widespread. They were aimed not at farmers but at the middle-men and stockists (Tilly, 1975 p.380ff; Tribe, 1981, p.96).

In 1763 meal riots took place in overregulated Glasgow markets (Forrester, 1987). Four years earlier a similar problem had provoked a similar expression of strong confidence in entrepreneurial solutions in Paris. The Journal of the Chamber of Commerce of September 1759 claimed that a cosmopolitan merchan

Entrepreneurs working in a market environment were thus seen as competitors in every aspect with the Polizei and Cameralist bureaucracies. Both systems offered "genius" supported by claims and terms later borrowed by Weber and extensible to the advised, rational, calculating or educated manager.

Enlightened rulers patronized mining and agriculture and also craftsmen and traders round the court. Patronage did not guarantee payment, however. Scarcely anywhere was payment assured for those who supplied clients of higher social station. Efforts to fund these widespread liabilities will concern us later. But the Enlightenment was still a period of protection and Mercantilist economics. Economic autarchy was encouraged, often by subsidies to home producers and by the improvement of internal communications. Imports were reduced with the aim of reducing the outflow of gold. Inversely, exports of commodities and artefacts were stimulated, often by bounties. The system required close guarding against smuggling along frontiers.

French policies towards commerce are well documented, especially for the Colbert era, and were imitated in Central Europe. We can therefore concentrate on one aspect chiefly, the incorporations by which trade and banking policies were implemented.

One problem was to secure a partnership between merchants and the nobility with their landed wealth. Duing the 18th century, commerce was gradually accepted as a reputable and civilizing pursuit (Hirschman, 1977, passim), so that nobles who had been unnecessarily barred from trade (according to Osse before 1556: Small, 1909, p.38), eventually won rights to join in ventures with gentlemen and merchants such as succeeded in English trading companies (Scott, 1912, p.444). French law reduced the barriers between the Estates in 1669 when nobles were allowed to participate in overseas ventures

Among early authors, Becher in 1673 was enthusiastic for trading companies: they were, he said, the best mode of achieving mercantile progress. He thought that some 14 companies could cure the evils of both monopoly and polypoly (too many suppliers). and would be able to meet most needs under government sponsorship (Small, 1909. p.129). Later Cameralists proposed that control of trading companies should rest with a bureau of Commerce composed of government nominees rather than merchants (ibid. p.358).

These corporations founded during the Enlightenment have a special interest in that their constitutions mirrored those of the state which legalized them. We may contrast them with the partnerships which so often and effectively facilitated international trade and finance (Forrester, 1988). Corporations subject to patronage seemed to be "little states" according to Sir James Steuart, writing on the Continent in 1767.

The sponsored companies in Central Europe competed for land and rights, business and power overseas. At home, companies were established to introduce new technology or to increase employment aided by protectionist duties or subsidies. Careful negotiations had to be made to prevent rivalry and trade-wars getting out of hand.

Inter-state commercial contracts were negotiated in detail; but negotiators for West European countries were held to have more exact figures on imports and exports available to them (Justi, 1759; Smalle 1909, p.540). Despite all the efforts to gather intelligence, it was held that Statistics were often lacking in Central Europe, and the reports from the markets and Bourses could not be relied on. Clearly commerce under mercantilist conditions required negotiations, agreements and controls in which centrally available data could have ambivalent effect.

Like other "states" the corporations found themselves fighting not with the economic rationality attributed in Paris to every cosompolitan trader but with political means. Intelligence needed to be complemented by influence. Survival was threatened less by any failure in the market than by possible withdrawal of official support, privileges, tariff concessions, commissions and subsidies (Kocka, 1978, p.506).

A withdrawal of Polizei from the control of manufactures and trade was heralded by the phrases "laisser-faire" and "laisser-passer." And the widest boundaries for protection were set by Napoleon’s Continental System and Berlin Decrees of 1806, which forbade trade with Britain. The veto was subsequently modified and by-passed by British entrepreneurs. Commerce was gradually accepted as having a beneficial and international role through the 19th century.

One area of activity of state concern now requires more detailed examination. Cameralists were inevitably faced by financial and credit problems; and their solution by heroic experiments round 1700AD was delegated to incorporated bodies.

Many of the problems of the 17th and 18th centuries were inherited from the centuries before. For instance, debts incurred for wars or other purposes remained personal, and non-heritable in many cases. One feature of royal finance from the Middle Ages was the number of commitments to expenditures or pensions beyond one life-span, while each new monarch had to re-assert his right even to long-fixed revenues (Ehrenberg, 1928163, p.40; Kantorowicz, 1957, passim). One sees, therefore, that perpetual debt often preceded any acceptance of a perpetual authority or claim of the state. Gradually however the king’s personal debts became Crown debt; and then in Britain after the Stuart kings had been displaced, it was found necessary to raise a National debt with annuities paid "upon the faith of the publick" (Maitland, 1900/38, p.xxxvi).

From the 16th century, and notably from Le Grand Parti of 1555 (Ehrenberg, 1928/63, p.302), French royal debts to specific borrowers tended to be funded on the major money markets such as Lyon. Participants would be treated in strict equity, rather than be ranked arbitrarily for settlement. Such equity of treatment of crown creditors was an aim of most depersonalizing of borrowing with a funding of debt.

Britain in the 18th century proceeded with a funding of debt which proved disastrous when the South Sea Company was brought in to manage the debt. Thereafter however credit was more closely regulated. And government debt eventually reached a "risk-free" status, at least in comparison with alternative investments. Experiments in Central Europe and elsewhere in transferring government debt to quasi-private banks may now be investigated.

For many reasons and not only in war-time, despots were considered doubtful risks and were forced to use intermediaries, of whom the French tax-farmers were the most powerful. At the end of the 17th century, regimes which were deeply and confusingly in debt sought to do their finance through banks or other institutions. Some were as safe as the Bank at Amsterdam (Schama, 1987) and served multiple functions. Other banks resulted from schemes to enhance credit, especially to the benefit of indebted monarchs. John Law’s banking ideas influenced both the Mississippi and South Sea companies. Subscribed capital was to be largely loaned to the government in return for interest-bearing bonds. Subscribers expected minimum government rates of interest, plus untold profits from overseas trading ventures. In each case, the share issues provoked bubble demand and consequent collapse.

The Universalbancalitat venture in Vienna is less known, and worth summary description. Law had also sent there publicity for his policies, whereby paper money be issued on the security of land or other credit-base (von Mensi, 1890, p.433). Some influence may also have been exercised by J.J.Becher who returned from Britain with blue-prints for production schemes and training, for long-term economic planning and for public banking (Kann, 1960, p.32).

There had been heroic plans earlier to reduce the imperial finances and book-keeping to order. A reform of the Imperial Treasury was attempted by its President, Count Starhemberg, for the critical years 1703-1715. His final claim is worth special attention. As a result of prompt and subdivided bookings of transactions, he proposed to be able to produce consolidations and summaries not only each year but also daily.

While the chief Prime-entry book should contain the progress of the whole cameral-negottii, the Chief Ledger represented the implementation of Starhemberg’s projected so-called

The Kaiser was thus to be able to see from his "oculus camerae", not obscurely but clearly and in whole or part every step of accounting, "and if and why it should trend up or down, and simultaneously control the execution of his orders and the work of his commission". (Holl, 1976, pp.384, 387; emphasis added).

This was a typical ideal of Enlightenment; an experienced president of the Imperial Camera proposed the means whereby his prince could exercise the powers bestowed on him. The needs and means for control in the Camera were different from the networks of very personal credit transactions recorded by traders. A self-conscious interaction between state and commercial accounting was becoming possible. In 1721, Barreme was to contrast more formally the converging rivers of French finance with the transactions of the trader, which were determined, he said, by Hazard (Forrester, 1986, p.11).

Cash-flow and its on-line control featured therefore in the planning if not in the achievements of the Cameratists of the start of the 18th century. But part of Starhemberg’s system was to consider other projects (as elsewhere; cf. Roseveare, 1973, p.174); and also to supervise the "managgio und den succehs" of the banks (Holl, 1976, p.383, emphasis added). The financial problems of the empire at this time were to be submitted for banking solutions.

There were successive banking ventures. A national GIRO bank was established in 1703, in imitation of that in Venice. It was soon converted into a more modest Vienna City Bank which folded within a generation (Kann, 1960, p.33).

This bank actually opened in 1715. It operated on the aims and constitution of a body granted letters patent two years earlier under the title "UniversalBancal FinanzOeconomie Demonstration". The goals were ambitious, and included paying war expenses, raising credit and reducing usury. As elsewhere, credit-worthiness could only be improved through some immunization from government. The Governing body of the Universalbancalitat was therefore independent of any official. A Perpetual Fund was to be built up from revenues outstanding, from taxes and fines; and from Contrabands and confiscations. There were also to be levies on Jews and four sources of special interest. These sources of credit included the officials who had previously received their remuneration less than punctually! Bancalist co-operators had to pay an annual legitimation fee of 3 to 200 Gulden, according to their level of participation. This was not always voluntary. Thus Caution-moneys lodged on behalf of employees entitled them to the title Bancalists. Governors on the Gubernium had to pay caution of 10,000 Fl., while Court, civil and military officials deposited at least 500 Gulden. A deduction of 3 percent commission was to be made for prompt payment of salaries. And lastly depositors were to receive repayment, less 1 percent discount, to cover accounting costs, etc. (von Mansi, 1890, pp.449, 438). The system meant that the state’s servants even in the Camera were to provide security for their personal intromissions, and thereby also a fund of credit for the Holy Roman Emperor!

All civil and military transactions were entrusted to the second Bancalitat Fund. The third fund was created to receive voluntary deposits, the receiptbills for which were to be negotiable. Indeed it was expected that these Valuta or Assignations would circulate like good coin. Three percent interest was allowed; but better terms were found elsewhere.

These funds were intended to cover the Empire’s extended debts and military and civil outlays. Rigorous rankings were imposed for such payments. But in practice insufficient credit was raised. In contrast to the overwhelming demand for the "bubble" shares in Paris and London, resistance to the Austrian scheme was met from the army, Treasury, the Estates and displeased civil servants. They combined to frustrate this ingenious and many-faceted scheme.

These causes of failure to secure participation and credit must seem more weighty than any critique of their efforts to apply double-entry book-keeping in the Imperial Camera. An invasion in 1717 by bank book-keepers is recorded (Schmalenbach, 1950, p.170): they filled endless books, and worked for 15 years without ever achieving a balance. If this be true, then the notional control by daily balances promised by Starhemberg’s system was quite unattainable even much later. Certainly a chief problem in state and estate accounting, which bankers scarcely encountered, arose from imperfectly monetized economies. Like their predecessors, the Cameralists had to operate in terms of both quantities and values.

The problem here was solved most simply by a "two-sided" but distinct account, with cash recorded "en face" and stock quantities "en dorse". More intricate devices were needed however, since state economics during the Enlightenment was still in transition between subsistence and a market and money economy. The latter enforced itself when aid had to be given or received and when transportation costs for specie were less than those for commodities. Cameral farms were best located where the Court most frequently visited, with all its needs for men and horses. These needs were expressed as relatively constant quantities or Rations per man by rank; and the Commissariat had to acquire sufficient quantities at the right places and times. Needs were met by the delivery of specified commodities in quantities which had been long fixed and due: but increased quantities could be demanded after improvements to the land. A control of quantities received and issued at court or camp was not too difficult (Forrester, 1983; 1989). Accounting for consumables adopted methods analogous to those used in the control of quantities and yields in metal industries.

The extraction and processing of ores often took place on agricultural estates. For metals as for crops, quantities chiefly could be controlled, while the problems of value were externalized to initial entry and final product points. In between, measured input quantities and mixes yielded good product and by-product or waste. Standards could be set for yields at sequential stages. For precious metals, physical measures played a vital role since the final product could be assayed, weighted and yet if uncontrolled stolen as though it were money. Markets and money could therefore be made peripheral to the rational administration of at least three foci of well ordered and benevolent despotisms. The metal smelter, the court and the camp could all be controlled in static ratios, if the inputs, the consumers and the outputs had fairly static relations to one another.

Often of course deliveries due from an estate were surplus or deficient to requirements. Or they might be best sold to enable comparable subsistence quantities to be acquired elsewhere. But markets supplied the large, local and immediate needs of camp or court only with difficulty and at seemingly high prices. We have noted the preference of princes and their servants to purchase on credit with payment at no certain term.

But for industry and commerce, one perceives contrary benefits when large uniform demands prompted new manufactures, markets or imports at competitive, marginal prices. One notes that power could be used to control consumptions in hierarchical camp or court and also to regulate prices in favour of the city rather than the region. The consumer sought favour compared to the interests of the grower or supplier. A balancing of interests between a benevolent despot and a motivated grower and supplier is in these cases a somewhat different exercise for assuring a continuing and reliable grain supply to a city. A fair pricing system for converting dues in kind into cash was widely adopted (and may have exercised some influence in contemporary inflation accounting).

Cameralist accounting had developed over the ages using Charge and Discharge in evolving manners and in imperial, princely and landlord’s camerae. It has been described as single-entry book-keeping with disputed relationships to double. The stages in its development have been more sophisticatedly spelled out by Walb (1927, p.210ff). Many stages took place after our period, while the innovations of the 18th century are said to mark the end of the first stage.

We have considered the Finances which were first due and then recorded as settled, and will show this aspect in greater detail in relation to budgets. Immediately we can give some detail to Justi’s advanced scheme of 1758 which obviously embodied double-entry recording. His system went behind the final reckoning to books of prime entry. He prescribed an inventory, memorial, journal, Debtor and Creditor books, also others for Cash, Stock, Expense and Secret items: all were to be kept in the greatest order, and exactly corresponding. Each period finished with a stock, "Rest" or due to or from the steward. The total would include balances unpaid over, debts uncollected or uncollectible, etc. Variances between recorded dues and actuals represented by desperate debts were intermittently written off (cf. Small, 1909, pp.346, 390). That was a Cameralist’s recommendation.

But effective reform of the Imperial Camera could be carried through, informed by the experience at the beginning of the 18th century, also by text-books such as Justi’s but considerably by experiments carried out on a smaller, estate scale such as by Auersberg in Bosnia. From such experiments came the requirements that chronological and systematic ledger records should be rigorously distinguished; and for every Due and Actual (Soll & lst) there must be a contra-entry. The experimenter was called Puechberg; and in 1760 he became Chief Bookkeeper to the Imperial Camera; and two years later his first book appeared. In 1774, he published further, showing how on Count Zinzendort’s estates, transactions in kind had been converted into cash terms. Results for the year were calculated from the difference between:

Opening stock [Bal. of cash, debts & kind]

+ Produce or cash received

- Payments to or for the landlord

= Total charge

- Closing Stock (as above)

= Results

Management accounting was required on estates as with enterprises, to "clarify the rightness of the economic speculations undertaken", according to Puechberg. Where valuation methods were applied consistently as prescribed, and if fixed capital formation was ignored, then any surplus in the Results indicated an underconsumption by the owner or reserved profit during the year (Schneider, 1981, p.121).

There were further developments and publications in Vienna (Schneider, 1981, p.12lff.). Profit for instance was estimated often in advance, based on expectations and dues, and then measured retrospectively to demonstrate the competence of stewards. Then there were applications in Italy, up to Villa (1801-1884) who related the accounting and organization of both public and private enterpises or "Aziendale". Consequently Italian accounting and economics are still rooted in a type of managerial agency (Filios, 1983).

Our descriptions must give way to an example (Table 1) of a Cameralist estate Account, as presented by Schrott in 1852 (v. Walb, 1926, p.255). Schneider (1981, p.123) maintains that his form has long deserved study. In the Account, we note the opening and closing columns for Rests or balances which exclude the new building. Then one notes the primacy of dues, legally collectable in the case of rents, attributed taxes and casualties, yet in the case of payments often requiring approval of an official quite independent of the paymaster. This account reveals procedures and meanings very different from traders’ accounting. Sections relate to distinct operations and functions. First we have the ordinary estate. Section II shows extra-ordinary items (which arise here rather than in traders’ accounts where all is at a venture). Prepayments and accruals follow; both being typical of the transfers or fictitious entries which make the system complete. Actuals mostly record cash transactions. But Results are calc ulated from Dues In and Out in Section 1. These results measure performance; they pay less attention to cash and actuals than typical banker’s or trader’s accounts; but they also serve in measuring consumable surplus.

Several features of Cameralist accounts can now be emphasized. With their focus on surplus and consumability, Cameralist accounting norms have been accepted for income measurement and taxation. And these norms have also been found to be extensible from personal to National Income measurement. And, thus, a Cameralist Revenue and Expense account became the basis for German income tax law (Fischer, 1905, p.185).

Cameralist accounts also served to indicate management efficiency. For checking efficiency, consistency between periods in valuations and in classification was necessary. And if choice was to be exercised, it was not by the accountable person. Stewards in their accounting must comply with their lord’s wishes, wrote Lange in 1776 (Walb, 1926, p.223): they could enter or remove no rubric or account class on their own. Cameralist formats therefore tend to be prescribed and to leave little choice. Comparisons with the results of other undertakings are thereby facilitated. An important division of labour is also necessary, and is introduced between those who do the authorization and those who pay or receive authorized amounts. Each due can be acted on only against specific authority or evidence of debt. Payments can then be seen as properly authorized or otherwise at audit. Rests may include hold-overs for cash or on authorizations (Berry, 1987. p.57).

Whatever the beginnings and the stages through which Cameralist accounting moved, its adaptability to estates and treasuries, to local authorities and public enterprises has been demonstrated by Walb (1926) and others. Wysocki (1965, pp.15-21) goes further and suggests that in advanced form it can give all the results obtainable from traders’ accounts, using principles corresponding with the principles of regular accounting under commercial law. This is a strong and recent claim. We now must show the advantages of cameralist accounting where planning and control seem apposite.

Let us first work retrospectively, and test whether there has been a direct but delayed and unconscious imitation of Cameralist practices by business managers and their teachers via Washington, DC. We know that budgeting was promptly commended to businesses by MacKinsey (1922) after the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 introduced this form of control to the US Federal Government. It was suggested that through business budgets, production planning and co-ordination could be accepted within a primarily financial framework: Such budgets were to give a primacy to the accounting period, to matched revenues and expenditures and to the dangers of illiquidity. But all these had been important when the Treasuries or Camerae of Europe endeavoured to control their "bougettes" or purses.

Budgeting was an effort to transfer to stewards some of the uncertainties which they could best anticipate and control. Landlords looked for budgets of the estate products which they could consume. Similarly princes looked for estimates of the gross and net revenues on which they could levy taxes. Stevin (1603, p.77) contrasted constant (Fixi) revenues with the "Fluxi" or variable, extraordinary levies. (The study of cost "behaviours" was therefore anticipated by estimates of revenue behaviours) Forecasting must seem to have been as inherent in enlightened rule as were checks and audit.

Cableljau (who could have been Stevin’s pupil) adapted double-entry ingeniously to the General Ledger of the Kingdom of Sweden from 1623. This ledger recorded the progressive sub-allocation of the total tax burden in debit form, with an upward aggregation of credits for receipts. Uncollected sums were transferred via the accounts of provinces to a variance account. The system may have also been used in Swedish Pomerania, and thus been known in Germany. (Once again, this accounting antedated the ex-ante/ex-post periodized economics of Gunnar Myrdal et al by 300 yearsl).

By 1689. data flowed through the Prussian Hofkammer so reliably and comprehensively that a general account, an audit and a budget for the coming year were possible (Dorward, 1953, p.117). Then the General Directory regulations of 1722 prescribed that accounts be audited at latest by the four weeks after Trinity. Weeks before that, provincial Commissariats and Kammer had to submit their budgets so that increases or reductions in planned expenditure could be investigated. Two budgets, for General Military and for General Domain items were to be presented to the king before Pentecost (Art, XXXI). (One observes how administration was to be ruled by calendar and later by the clock.)

In both France and Germany, the relation between budget and actual was emphasized, for each was an "Etait ". Budgets were "Etats provisional"; actual, historic accounts wore "Etats au vrai". We do not know how formal the representations ordered by Louis XII were, to be made to the French States-general in the form of an "Etat General"; but we do know that he felt no need to make any such representations to support a request for Aides. From 1611, the French king ceased to call his States-general altogether, and thus avoided undesired requests for redress of grievances. Taxation from year to year was professionalized through tax-farmers. The French example in absolutism was tempting to follow, without any need for annual accountabilty.

But with the Revolution, a new and format annual accountability was introduced at least until 1813 when Napoleon levied taxes by decree. From 1815, strict budgeting has spread through European states. Some of the formalities are worth noting:

None of the above principles appear ideally applicable in budgeting for the firm or farm. There netted-off revenue and expense by project or product give profitabilites; specialization scarcely applies since few items can be approved beforehand; and equilibrium is replaced in competitive circumstances by profit maximization. Annuality applies chiefly to tax and dividends, although farms have their seasonality. There is thus little direct transferability of state budgeting to the circumstances of the firm. But some exceptions may be noted. Prior approval of expense may be enforced when major works are financed against projected cost and authorized capital. And controls through dues and actuals may be applied in a bounded economy in publicly controlled industries.

The control problem was poignantly illustrated by the fate of a senior Cameralist whom we have already met. Justi, 20 years after writing his often-quoted text, accepted responsibility for a state-controlled foundry at Vietz and for a forge at Kutzdorf. When there were unfavourable production variances combined with possible deficits, he was held responsible and imprisoned in 1778! He died three years later, still in prison (Hubatsch, 1975, p.84). (The system which condemned him is less publicized than that which brought French financiers to trial and bankruptcy.)

The controls from which Justi suffered were applied in an iron works some years later. The very sophisticated system was described by Cameral Director Fredersdorff in 1802. He wrote for a comparable Iron Works Economie. Whole paragraphs (e.g. from pp.99, 100, 104 451: v. Schneider, 1981, p. 197) find echo today:

Let us check for verbal resonance with state budgeting. The time-period recalls "bi-focal" time-spans for taxation and accountability and differing possible horizons of provision or forecastability as to probable conditions. Undoubtedly, the probabilities of the mathematicians of the Enlightenment should be re-interpreted to show the ranges within which administrators of the period were willing to work between pre-set intervals. In the Sales Budget, projections were required with no distinction between what could be sold (opening stock plus production of period) and what might be sold at different prices. The effectiveness of competition assumed by Fredersdorff is not clear. It might vary by state. Thus every manufacturer in Berg-Julich up the Rhine, till ten years earlier, is known to have enjoyed a commercial freedom and prosperity not achieved elsewhere due to monopolies and market controls. There must have been direct or indirect competition for Fredersdorff’s firm also from family firms such as that of the Harkorts at Hagen. There (writes Barkhausen, 1974, pp.225 & 262) "Mercantilist control and promotion of commerce was impossible". But Fredersdorff along with most other Mercantilists gave primacy to sales or exports without concern for an equilibration of production and sales at some optimal point.

The Cash budget was that which most nearly approximates to state budgeting. It was to be prepared so that all expense can be reflected therein. Clearly, budgets and actuals were as closely related as debits and credits for a trader. Where receipts or payments did not refer to the immediate period, an ingenious system of prepayment vouchers was adopted which could be carried forward along with the actual cash balance to next year. Fredersdorff’s Construction Account will bear representation (Schneider, 1981, p.346):-

Governments of states practised budgeting through the 19th century and exposed their budgets to tax-payers with emerging democratic electoral rights. But budgeting and forecasting were delayed or opposed in the private sector. Inevitably industrialists made anticipations, prepared estimates and quoted prices with changing sanguine or pessimistic mood. A generation after the solidarity of the Continental System, customs unions were accepted by many states. These wider markets brought with them uncertainties. These uncertainties were considered controllable by a few tactics. One method was to welcome a more liberal era, to compete successfully and to grow. With growth, direct supervision became impracticable; and records, communications and control systems and book-keeping spread apace. Rather than cope with business cycles by the type of planning that was feasible within tighly controlled boundaries, contra-cyclical pricing tactics were advocated. They represented an alternative for the firm to planning or market domination.

But there was an alternative tactic available to the German farmer or "fabricant" which was to reduce uncertainty by co-operating with his fellow producers in a kartel. Kartels could lobby for protection by levies or quotas on imports. Such kartels and protection won acceptance in Prussia from 1880. The kartel organization required quantitative data, and facts were preferred to forecasts.

Some further reasons have been suggested why in the liberal and subsequent eras the budgeting evolved by Cameralists and taught to bureaucrats was not as such applied by entrepreneurs. So little was it applied that when from the 1950s firms began to budget, it was in ignorance of local precedent and in imitation of temporally shallower American practice. Firstly traders into the present century were widely suspicious of bureaucrats and their formal schooling: they preferred to educate their successors through practical and international experience.

Again, both law and economics gave little attention to the techniques and problems of planning at micro-level, while double-entry book-keeping and balance sheets were preferred to the yield or revenue accounts which must form the heart of budgeting. For 50 years after the German commercial colleges were founded, planning targets set at the level of the firm were scorned, while inter-firm comparisons were pursued. Schneider (1981, p.125) describes these comparisons as a "will o’ the wisp". He suggests that market equilibrium provides little guidance in the entrepreneurial situation (Schneider, 1989, p.24ff). He argues that the constitutions of firms and markets are correlated. He challenges many beliefs, but gives insufficient attention to planning on a totalitarian basis applied in Germany within living memory.

A cautionary tale can be found in the "Gleichschaltung" or total planning under the Nazis. The degree to which business accounts, sectoral aggregations and national accounts were effectively integrated is not clear; but certainly the Goering Plan and its accounting charts used not only financial and product data but also statistics and budgets. Under the Fuehrer, an informed "Lenkung" or control of the economies in The New Order was supposed to proceed. Cameralist accounting methods were officially permitted as alternative to double-entry. Before and after the Nazi experience, many Business Economists have implied that budgeting is more applicable in the public sector than in the private.

A summary of such width and depth in years of evidence is not easy. First it was claimed that Continental Cameralism had lent, across the Atlantic and over many decades, a repute as well as some theories of rationalism to the management trainings offered by American Business Schools. Masters of Business Administration inhale something at least from the Cameralist tradition. Cameralism was taught at universities from 1727; but much of the Polizei or total welfare theory was developed to fill gaps in charitable provision. When combined with Intelligence systems and with forecasts or committed budgets, a bureaucratic rationalism emerged which appeared beguiling to the benevolence of hereditary and despotic masters. Many tactics were developed especially in the 18th century. Some of these required data-gathering and projections for state, estate or firm, which could be combined only later with the aleatory probabilities of the mathematicians. Welfare like warfare never became a simple exercise in rationalism.< /P>

The period of absolutism gave way to a liberal period, notably as Smith’s economics were transfused into Germany via Kant and his colleagues at Konigsberg. Cameralist education was modified, and the state’s agenda was reduced. Moreover a nation-bounded bureaucracy could no longer control a commerce which worked internationally. Banks and companies which had failed to restore credit to the treasuries of Austria, Britain and France, gradually achieved some independence although continuing to shadow the constitutions of their patron state. Their records centred however not on the budgets whereby the state justified its levies for the ensuing period, but on transactions recorded in double-entry. There was some compatibility only between traders’ Balances and Cameralist stewardship accounts which disclosed performance and disposable surplus. Many principles and forms of management accounting have been traced to distant times when expectations of persons and systems were high. The expectations were however direc ted towards divinely inherited despotisms as much as to the Cameral staff who supported them. (While our attention has been directed to the little states which grew up in the dying days of the Holy Roman Empire, comparable ambitions and tactics might be found in application in those countries which have won freedom as Western colonialism has withdrawn.)

The vestiges of paternalism are far from dead; and human rights, phrased largely in individualist terms, are to be exercised against omnicompetent authorities (which are the chief recourse still in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). But our purpose has been to set nationalism and welfare as background only against which we have derived specific applications of the rationalism of the Enlightenment period. We have found among the practices of the trained bureaucracies of the states of Central Europe some of the statistical and accounting techniques which have continued in use or been restored to use relatively recently by large firms. The control techniques have been seen as part of the risk-reduction and risk-calculation of a society which developed probabilism and tamed much of nature. In the 18th century bonds of family and status were replaced by an administration of individual subjects using Intelligence systems. We have aimed to extend the intelligence of today’s managers and accountants back to those times.

This essay was prompted by a study of Cameralism by Dr V.Filios (Athens). Criticism and help has been offered by R.Briston (Hull); A.Clunies-Ross, R.Wilkie, D.Holden & A.G.Puxty (Strathclyde); T.Munck & J.Spender (Glasgow); K.Tribe (Keit); G.Seicht (Vienna); Peter Dean at the United Nations Development Office; N.Waszek (Erlangen). Acknowledgements are specially due to Dieter Schneider (Bochum).

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